The two Russian-language textbooks of the regional history course Donbass i Novorossiya. Istoriya nashego kraya, reproduced in full and unaltered: the Year 5 textbook, from prehistory to the seventeenth century, and the combined Years 6 to 7 textbook, from the end of the seventeenth century to 2022. Both imprints state that they are admitted for use in state-accredited schools under an order of the Russian Ministry of Education of June, with the year and number left blank, which indicates that these are pre-approval or first-print layout files produced in July 2026. They are published here as evidence of what occupation schools are given to teach.
The course is written for children aged about 10 to 13 in the occupied territories and is designed as one three-year programme. It does not deny Kyivan Rus or the Zaporozhian Sich; it detaches them from any Ukrainian continuity. Kyiv's inheritance passes to Moscow, the Cossacks become Russian-speaking "Russian settlers", the Sich's destruction in 1775 is never described, "Ukraine" is introduced as a contemptuous Polish name, the Ukrainian SSR as a Bolshevik imposition "against the will of the inhabitants", Ukrainisation as violence, and independent Ukraine as a "self-styled" "anti-Russia". The final section, "Return to Russia", presents the 2022 invasion and annexation as the completion of the region's history, and the end-of-chapter questions require pupils to explain and "prove" these conclusions.
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Key passages only. Quotation table compiled by the Centre for the Study of Occupation and translated by TOT Insights; quotations checked against the textbooks. Page numbers are the printed page numbers. For the full text, refer to the original Russian-language textbooks above.
Purpose. This is a systematic evidence table for use in analytical materials, presentations and citation. Quotations are referenced by the printed page numbers of the textbooks. The analytical columns assess how the narrative is constructed: the selection of facts, terminology and teaching techniques. This is not a full external fact-check of every historical claim; the assessment rests primarily on the internal logic of the textbooks themselves and on what they include, omit or substitute. Key analytical principle. Not every quotation below is false in itself. Some are “anchor points” that show how accurate or neutral facts are stitched into a teleological scheme: Rus' → Moscow/Russia → the Cossacks as part of a “Russian” space → “Novorossiya” → Ukraine as an external or artificial period → “return to Russia”.
Year 5 textbook
A. P. Bogdanov and V. N. Ilyin, Donbass and Novorossiya: History of Our Region. Year 5. Moscow, 2026. 248 pp.
| Page | Quotation (Russian original, with English translation) | Technique | What is erased or substituted | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5 | «Эти земли получили свои имена, войдя в Россию.» “These lands received their names on entering Russia.” | Predetermined integration frame | The earlier history of the territories is immediately subordinated to their future entry into Russia. | Even before the historical narrative begins, the region is defined through Russia. This programmes the reader to see all earlier periods as the prehistory of “entry”, rather than as the plural history of the territories. |
| 5 | «…одновременно строили и укрепляли нашу общую великую Родину — Россию.» “…at the same time built and strengthened our common great Motherland: Russia.” | Retrospective nationalisation of the past | Ancestors from different eras and political communities are retrospectively incorporated into a single Russian historical community. | The formula creates continuity between people of ancient and medieval times and the present-day Russian Federation, although no such political identity existed then. |
| 92 | § 11 «РУСЬ ОСВАИВАЕТ СТЕПЬ». “§ 11 ‘Rus' settles the steppe’.” | Terminological framing | Rus' is presented as the direct predecessor of Russian state history; the term “Kyivan Rus'” is not used. | The term “Rus'” is correct in itself. What matters is the construction of succession that follows: Kyiv is acknowledged as the centre of Rus', but a Ukrainian line of succession is barely developed thereafter. |
| 95–96 | «…сообщается о двух политических центрах: северном … и южном — на среднем Днепре вокруг Киева.» “…two political centres: a northern one … and a southern one, on the middle Dnieper around Kyiv.” | Selective recognition of Kyiv | Kyiv is recognised as one of the centres of early Rus', but this does not carry over into an independent Ukrainian historical continuity. | The quotation matters precisely as a control: the textbook does not deny Kyiv's role. The manipulative effect arises later, when the heritage of Rus' is reoriented towards Moscow. |
| 96 | «В 882 г. он захватил Киев и сел княжить здесь. “Пусть будет Киев матерью городам русским”.» “In 882 he seized Kyiv and took the throne there. ‘Let Kyiv be the mother of Russian cities’.” | Appropriation of shared heritage | Kyiv's centrality is folded into a narrative of “Russian cities” without distinguishing historical Rus' from later Russia. | The chronicle phrase is used in the textbook as a link in future Russian history; a distinct Ukrainian context for the formation of Rus' is not developed. |
| 100 | «Столицей Руси стал Киев.» “Kyiv became the capital of Rus'.” | Selective recognition followed by redirection of succession | Kyiv's centrality is acknowledged, but political succession then shifts to Moscow. | This shows that the mechanism is not the erasure of Kyiv. It lies in changing the trajectory of the heritage: Kyiv as the beginning, Moscow as the centre and successor. |
| 150 | § 18 «СТЕПЬ В БОРЬБЕ МОСКВЫ, ЛИТВЫ И ОРДЫ». “§ 18 ‘The steppe in the struggle between Moscow, Lithuania and the Horde’.” | Shift in the centre of the narrative | After the Mongol period, Moscow becomes one of the three main actors in the region's history. | The section title itself moves the centre of gravity from Kyiv and south-western Rus' to Moscow, and casts Moscow as the chief claimant to the “Rus' lands”. |
| 152 | «…князьям Литовского княжества удалось захватить западные русские земли: Полоцкую, Волынскую, Киевскую, Переяславскую и Черниговскую.» “…the princes of the Lithuanian principality managed to seize the western Russian lands: Polotsk, Volhynia, Kyiv, Pereiaslav and Chernihiv.” | Delegitimisation of an alternative Rus' tradition | The incorporation of Rus' lands into the Grand Duchy of Lithuania is described as “seizure”. | The verb “seize” immediately sets an external, alien frame for Lithuania and makes the Muscovite narrative of claims seem more natural. |
| 153 | «Литовские князья рассчитывали подчинить себе все русские земли.» “The Lithuanian princes hoped to subjugate all the Russian lands.” | Asymmetric attribution of motives | The Lithuanian political project is described as an aspiration to subjugate “all the Russian lands”. | This description does not treat the competing centres of Rus' symmetrically: it presents Lithuania as an external claimant, while Moscow is subsequently described as the centre of consolidation. |
| 155 | «Иван Калита … превратил Москву в центр русской духовности во главе с митрополитом всея Руси.» “Ivan Kalita … turned Moscow into the centre of Russian spirituality, headed by the Metropolitan of all Rus'.” | Construction of Moscow as the centre of succession | The religious and political heritage of Rus' is assigned to Moscow. | This is one of the key links in the narrative bridge from Rus' to Moscow: not only the political but also the spiritual centre is transferred to Moscow. |
| 158 | «Это стало переломным моментом в борьбе за освобождение русских земель от ордынского ига.» “This became a turning point in the struggle to liberate the Russian lands from the Horde yoke.” | All-Rus' framing of a Muscovite victory | A Muscovite episode is presented as an event for all the “Russian lands”. | Didactically, the Battle of Kulikovo is turned from an event involving a single centre into a stage in the general “liberation of Rus'”, which reinforces Moscow's monopoly on the heritage. |
| 158 | «Объясните, почему победа в Куликовской битве отмечается как День воинской славы России.» “Explain why victory in the Battle of Kulikovo is commemorated as a Day of Military Glory of Russia.” | Didactic stitching of eras | The medieval history of Rus' is tied directly to the present-day state memory of the Russian Federation. | The question does not invite a comparison of interpretations; it requires pupils to explain an already established link between fourteenth-century Rus' and present-day Russia. |
| 192 | «Испокон веков в казаки принимали всех, кто был честен и храбр, говорил по-русски…» “Since time immemorial, the Cossacks accepted anyone who was honest and brave and spoke Russian…” | Russification of Cossack origins | “Spoke Russian” is declared a linguistic marker of the early Cossacks. | The formula projects a modern or later linguistic and national category onto the early Cossacks and incorporates them into Russian identity from the outset. |
| 194 | «В Запорожье русские поселенцы появились после завоевания западного Приднепровья Великим княжеством Литовским.» “Russian settlers appeared in Zaporizhzhia after the Grand Duchy of Lithuania conquered the western Dnieper region.” | Russification of the Zaporozhian story | The population from which the Zaporozhian Cossacks are derived is defined as “Russian settlers”. | Zaporizhzhia is introduced not as a distinct Ukrainian Cossack tradition but as a space of Russian Orthodox settlers under foreign rule. |
| 195 | «…крепость. Она стала центром казачьей республики — Запорожской Сечи.» “…a fortress. It became the centre of the Cossack republic, the Zaporozhian Sich.” | Recognition of agency, followed by narrowing | The textbook explicitly acknowledges the republican and elective organisation of the Sich. | This is an important control quotation: Cossack political organisation is not denied. Its role, however, is subsequently subordinated to the history of the “Russian lands” and Moscow. |
| 211 | § 25 «ВЕЛИКАЯ РОССИЯ НАБИРАЕТ СИЛУ». “§ 25 ‘Great Russia gathers strength’.” | Teleological imperial frame | The region's seventeenth-century history is structured around the strengthening of Russia. | The section title sets up not a neutral regional history but a story of the rise of “Great Russia”, towards which the subsequent Cossack events are directed. |
| 216 | «[Поляки] презрительно называли области, населённые русскими православными, Украиной, то есть окраиной.» “[The Poles] contemptuously called the areas inhabited by Russian Orthodox people Ukraine, that is, the outskirts.” | Etymological reduction; delegitimisation of the name Ukraine | The name “Ukraine” is presented as an external, contemptuous Polish term meaning “outskirts”. | This cuts off other historical meanings and uses of the name and leads pupils to see “Ukraine” as a derivative, imposed and secondary name. |
| 216 | «Украинцев за людей они не считали, относясь к ним как к рабам, говорящему скоту.» “They did not regard Ukrainians as human beings, treating them as slaves, as talking cattle.” | Emotional polarisation | The first clear appearance of “Ukrainians” is linked to humiliation by the Poles. | Ukrainian identity is introduced not as the outcome of its own historical development but through an image of external oppression, after which Russia appears as the natural alternative. |
| 220 | «ВХОЖДЕНИЕ МАЛОРОССИИ В РОССИЮ.» “THE ENTRY OF LITTLE RUSSIA (MALOROSSIYA) INTO RUSSIA.” | Terminological substitution of agency | The Khmelnytsky Uprising is framed in advance as a process of “Little Russia” entering Russia. | The heading sets out the outcome before the causes and alternatives: the Cossack revolution and state-building are reduced to a trajectory of accession. |
| 220 | «Они положили начало объединению Великой, Малой и Белой России.» “They laid the foundation for the unification of Great, Little and White Russia.” | Construction of a triune people and lands | The Cossack wars are interpreted as the beginning of the unification of the three “Russias”. | This recasts the conflict between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Cossack society as the “gathering” of a Russian space presumed to have been united all along. |
| 221 | «…пророссийские настроения рядового казачества побудили Хмельницкого обратиться к царю…» “…the pro-Russian sentiments of the rank-and-file Cossacks prompted Khmelnytsky to turn to the tsar…” | Reduction of motives; teleology | Khmelnytsky's decision is explained primarily by the “pro-Russian sentiments” of the Cossacks. | A complex diplomatic, military and political situation is narrowed to a predetermined vector towards Russia. |
| 221 | «…принять “всю Малороссию его и всё Войско Запорожское в вечное своё твёрдое владение, подданство и покровительство”.» “…to accept ‘all his Little Russia and the entire Zaporozhian Host into his eternal firm possession, subjecthood and protection’.” | Subjecthood frame | Relations with the Muscovite state are presented through the vocabulary of “eternal possession” and subjecthood. | The quotation is used as the main proof that entry was natural, without an equivalent discussion of the contested status of the agreement and of the autonomous institutions. |
| 222 | «…было принято решение о воссоединении земель Малороссии и Войска Запорожского с Россией.» “…the decision was taken on the reunification of the lands of Little Russia and the Zaporozhian Host with Russia.” | Normative formula of “reunification” | The Pereiaslav Council is treated not as an agreement or alliance of contested status but as “reunification”. | The term “reunification” already contains the conclusion: the parties supposedly once formed a single whole, so accession is presented as the restoration of a natural state. |
| 222 | «Так началось воссоединение русских земель.» “Thus began the reunification of the Russian lands.” | Direct consolidation of the historical scheme | Ukrainian and Cossack lands are incorporated into the process of “reunifying the Russian lands”. | This is the textbook's central formula: Cossack political history is built into Moscow's programme of “gathering the lands”. |
| 223 | «В Москве были подтверждены права и вольности Войска Запорожского. Оно получило широкую автономию.» “In Moscow the rights and liberties of the Zaporozhian Host were confirmed. It received broad autonomy.” | Partial recognition of autonomy | Autonomy is acknowledged, but as a part of an already unified space, granted or confirmed by Moscow. | The quotation shows not the complete erasure of the Hetmanate but its reduction to autonomy within a Russian frame. |
| 228 | «Расскажите, как происходило воссоединение русских земель в XVII в. Какую роль в этом процессе сыграл Богдан Хмельницкий?» “Describe how the reunification of the Russian lands took place in the seventeenth century. What role did Bohdan Khmelnytsky play in this process?” | Didactic imposition of a conclusion | Pupils are not invited to assess different interpretations; “reunification” is built into the question as an established fact. | This is one of the clearest examples of the indoctrinating function of the exercises: the correct frame for the answer is set by the wording itself. |
Years 6–7 textbook
A. P. Bogdanov and V. N. Ilyin, Donbass and Novorossiya: History of Our Region. Years 6–7. Moscow, 2026. 280 pp.
| Page | Quotation (Russian original, with English translation) | Technique | What is erased or substituted | Comment |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 (imprint) | «…развитию в составе Российской империи и СССР, а также возвращению в состав России.» “…its development within the Russian Empire and the USSR, and also its return to Russia.” | Programmatic frame of the textbook | The end of the region's history is defined in advance as a “return” to Russia. | This is not a conclusion reached after the narrative but a declared methodological aim: the whole course is organised so that 2022 appears as the completion of a historical pattern. |
| 5 | «Земли Донбасса и Новороссии вернулись в состав России два с половиной столетия назад.» “The lands of Donbas and Novorossiya returned to Russia two and a half centuries ago.” | Retrospective legitimisation of imperial expansion | Eighteenth-century incorporation is defined as a “return”, that is, as the restoration of a prior belonging. | The word “returned” rules out in advance any interpretation of imperial expansion as the conquest or annexation of territory. |
| 5 | «…земли Новороссии и большей части Донбасса против воли жителей были включены … в состав … Украинской [республики].» “…the lands of Novorossiya and most of Donbas were, against the will of their inhabitants, included … in the … Ukrainian [republic].” | Delegitimisation of the Ukrainian administrative period | Inclusion in Soviet Ukraine is presented as an act carried out “against the will of the inhabitants”. | This creates a long line in which Ukraine is, from the outset, an external administrative construct for the region. |
| 5 | «…украинские националисты служили оккупантам.» “…Ukrainian nationalists served the occupiers.” | Generalising discreditation | The Ukrainian national movement is reduced to collaboration with the occupiers. | The introduction makes no distinction between organisations, periods and positions; the negative category “Ukrainian nationalists” is then carried over to contemporary topics. |
| 5 | «В результате государственного переворота в феврале 2014 г. новыми “героями” Украины были объявлены прислужники Гитлера.» “As a result of the coup d'état in February 2014, Hitler's henchmen were declared Ukraine's new ‘heroes’.” | Delegitimisation of contemporary Ukraine through historical analogy | 2014 is defined from the start as a coup, and Ukrainian memory politics as the glorification of “Hitler's henchmen”. | The present-day political conflict is introduced through a morally closed frame before the events are even described. |
| 5 | «В этих условиях 24 февраля 2022 г. Россия была вынуждена начать специальную военную операцию (СВО).» “In these circumstances, on 24 February 2022 Russia was forced to begin the special military operation (SMO).” | Frame of inevitability; removal of agency | Russia's decision to start the war is described as a forced reaction. | The grammatical construction “was forced” removes Russia's status as the initiator of the decision and sets up causality through Ukraine's prior actions. |
| 5 | «Подавляющее большинство жителей поддержало возвращение земель Донбасса и Новороссии в состав России.» “The overwhelming majority of residents supported the return of the lands of Donbas and Novorossiya to Russia.” | Legitimisation through “return” | The events of 2022 are presented as the realisation of a historically natural return. | The term “return” repeats the opening frame and closes the course into a loop: Russia was the “beginning” and becomes the “end”. |
| 16 | «Постепенное включение в состав России в первой половине XVIII в. стало благотворным для нашего края.» “Gradual incorporation into Russia in the first half of the eighteenth century was beneficial for our region.” | Normative assessment of imperial expansion | Incorporation into Russia is not analysed as a conflict of interests but immediately judged “beneficial”. | The value judgement precedes the description of consequences and shapes the “correct” emotional response to imperial expansion among pupils. |
| 19 | «Однако запорожцы всё равно грабили малороссийские земли…» “However, the Zaporozhians still plundered the Little Russian lands…” | Criminalisation of autonomous Cossack action | The Zaporozhians are described in terms of plunder and disobedience to state order. | This prepares the reader to interpret Russia's subsequent punitive actions as a response to dangerous disloyalty. |
| 19 | «…гетманом Войска Запорожского Иваном Мазепой, который задумал изменить Петру I.» “…Hetman of the Zaporozhian Host Ivan Mazepa, who planned to betray Peter I.” | Personalisation as “treason” | Mazepa's political choice is reduced to a personal betrayal of Peter I. | The complex question of the Hetmanate's status and of shifting alliances is turned into a moral category of loyalty or betrayal towards the monarch. |
| 19 | «Запорожцы Чертомлыкской Сечи в итоге поддались на посулы.» “The Zaporozhians of the Chortomlyk Sich eventually succumbed to the blandishments.” | Delegitimisation of a political choice | The alliance of some of the Zaporozhians with Sweden is explained by “blandishments”. | The formula deprives the Cossacks of rational political agency and presents them as having been deceived. |
| 19 | «В ответ три полка русской армии уничтожили казачьи крепости и разорили Чертомлыкскую Сечь.» “In response, three regiments of the Russian army destroyed the Cossack fortresses and laid waste to the Chortomlyk Sich.” | Normalisation of a punitive action | The destruction of the Sich is presented as a response to “treason” and “blandishments”. | The causal montage “disloyalty → natural response” makes the violent liquidation of the Cossack centre appear logical and justified. |
| 20 | «В 1734 г. императрица Анна Иоанновна простила запорожцев и разрешила им вернуться в Россию.» “In 1734 Empress Anna Ioannovna pardoned the Zaporozhians and allowed them to return to Russia.” | Paternalistic frame | The Zaporozhians are shown as subjects whom the monarch may “pardon” and allow to “return”. | Relations with the Cossack community are described not as negotiations with an autonomous political actor but as a vertical relationship between a monarch and guilty subjects. |
| 21 | «Здесь они основали Новую Сечь (существовала до 1775 г.).» “Here they founded the New Sich (which existed until 1775).” | Silence about a key act | The date on which the New Sich ended is recorded without explaining who abolished it, or how. | This is where the mechanism of removal is visible: the political existence of the Sich is named, but its liquidation by the Russian Empire does not become an event in its own right. |
| 40 | § 5 «РОЖДЕНИЕ НОВОРОССИИ». “§ 5 ‘The birth of Novorossiya’.” | Replacement of Cossack space with imperial geography | After the Cossack topics, the historical frame moves on to the “birth of Novorossiya”. | Structurally, this is the point at which the subject changes: instead of Zaporizhzhia as a political space, an imperial administrative construct becomes the main subject. |
| 40 | «Как пустынные степи на южных окраинах России за несколько десятилетий превратились в процветающую губернию?» “How did the empty steppes on the southern fringes of Russia turn into a flourishing province within a few decades?” | Colonial myth of “empty space” | The Cossack winter farmsteads, trades and settlements described earlier are erased by the formula “empty steppes”. | The question builds the classic scheme “empty land → imperial development → prosperity”, even though the textbook itself earlier describes a populated and economically developed space. |
| 43 | «В 1775 г. в Новороссийскую губернию включили владения бывшей Запорожской Сечи.» “In 1775 the possessions of the former Zaporozhian Sich were included in the Novorossiya Governorate.” | Euphemistic treatment of the liquidation of the Sich | The transfer of the Zaporozhian lands to imperial control is described with the administrative verb “were included”. | The key causal chain (liquidation of the Sich, redistribution of land, consequences for the Cossacks) is replaced by a neutral administrative verb. |
| 44 | «…земель, которые прежде бывшими запорожцами оставлены были в небрежении…» “…lands which had previously been left in neglect by the former Zaporozhians…” | Colonial discrediting of previous land use | Cossack farming is characterised as negligent or undeveloped. | An imperial source is built into the text as proof of “proper development” after the removal of the Zaporozhians. |
| 57 | «Европейские государства приходили на новые земли, чтобы покорять и порабощать, и только Россия — чтобы поддерживать и просвещать.» “European states came to new lands to conquer and enslave, and only Russia came to support and enlighten.” | Imperial exceptionalism | Russian expansion is placed, as a matter of principle, outside colonialism and conquest. | This is a direct normative claim of Russia's moral exceptionalism; it is not presented as the position of a source or as a subject for discussion. |
| 191 | «Почему языковая политика стала препятствием на этом пути?» “Why did language policy become an obstacle on this path?” | Didactic programming of the answer | Language policy is defined as an “obstacle” before the material has been examined. | Pupils are not asked to investigate the consequences of indigenisation (korenizatsiya) but to explain a predetermined negative assessment. |
| 195 | «Развитие общего, профессионального и высшего образования сильно затормозил проект “украинской школы”.» “The development of general, vocational and higher education was severely held back by the ‘Ukrainian school’ project.” | Causal reduction; negative portrayal of Ukrainian education | The Ukrainisation of education is defined as a factor holding back its development. | Language policy is placed at the causal centre of the problems in education; alternative factors are absent from this sentence. |
| 196 | «После включения в состав УССР Донбасс и Новороссия подверглись украинизации.» “After being included in the Ukrainian SSR, Donbas and Novorossiya were subjected to Ukrainisation.” | Frame of external coercion | The verb “were subjected to” presents Ukrainisation as something inflicted on the region. | Grammatically, the region is not a participant in the policy but the passive object of a coercive act. |
| 196 | «Русский язык запретили использовать на вывесках, объявлениях, печатях.» “The use of Russian on signs, notices and seals was banned.” | Selective emphasis on repressive aspects | Indigenisation policy is reduced to bans and administrative pressure. | Individual restrictions are presented without equal context about Union-wide indigenisation and its aims; this creates an image of the policy as wholesale de-Russification. |
| 198 | «Насильственное насаждение украинского языка вызвало сопротивление населения нашего края.» “The forcible imposition of the Ukrainian language provoked resistance among the population of our region.” | Concluding formula of coercion | The Ukrainian language is explicitly described as “imposed” by force. | This is no longer a citation of opponents of Ukrainisation but the authors' own summary of the section, which fixes a single interpretation as a learning outcome. |
| 241 | § 12 «В “САМОСТИЙНОЙ” УКРАИНЕ». “§ 12 ‘In “self-styled” (samostiinaya) Ukraine’.” | Discrediting vocabulary in the heading | Ukraine's independence is marked with quotation marks and the word “self-styled” (samostiinaya), with an ironic and contemptuous undertone. | The value judgement is built into the section title, so the period of independence is not presented neutrally even before the facts are read. |
| 241 | «Украинские националисты приложили огромные усилия к разрушению СССР.» “Ukrainian nationalists made enormous efforts to destroy the USSR.” | Personification of the collapse through “nationalists” | The collapse of the USSR is explained by the activity of Ukrainian nationalists. | A complex systemic process is reduced to the action of a single political enemy; the same category is then carried over to contemporary Ukraine. |
| 244 | «…власти в Киеве под давлением Запада и националистов делали всё, чтобы … превратить Украину в анти-Россию.» “…the authorities in Kyiv, under pressure from the West and the nationalists, did everything to … turn Ukraine into an anti-Russia.” | Conspiratorial external frame | Ukraine's policy is presented as the product of pressure from the West and nationalists, aimed at creating an “anti-Russia”. | Ukrainian political agency is negated: external forces are declared the main source of decisions. |
| 244 | «Уже при первом президенте Украины Леониде Кравчуке был взят курс на переписывание и искажение истории.» “Already under Ukraine's first president, Leonid Kravchuk, a course was set towards rewriting and distorting history.” | Delegitimisation of Ukrainian historiography | The Ukrainian view of the past is declared to be “rewriting” and “distortion”. | In this way the textbook devalues alternative interpretations of history in advance and monopolises the right to the “correct” version. |
| 244 | «Предателя Мазепу объявили “национальным героем Украины”, которой при Петре I не было и в помине.» “The traitor Mazepa was declared a ‘national hero of Ukraine’, a Ukraine of which there was not a trace under Peter I.” | Denial of Ukraine's historical continuity | A political verdict on Mazepa (“traitor”) is combined with the claim that Ukraine did not exist as a historical actor. | This closes the loop on the Year 5 storyline: the Cossack era is not treated as part of the formation of a Ukrainian political tradition. |
| 249 | «Так открылась самая чёрная страница недолгой истории Украины.» “Thus opened the blackest page of Ukraine's short history.” | Emotive, evaluative discreditation | The history of independent Ukraine is characterised as “short”, and the period after 2014 as its “blackest page”. | This is the vocabulary of journalism rather than analysis; it delivers a moral verdict on the state as part of the teaching material. |
| 250 | «В 2014 г. в Киеве произошёл поддержанный Западом государственный переворот, к власти пришли радикальные националисты.» “In 2014 a West-backed coup d'état took place in Kyiv, and radical nationalists came to power.” | Didactic consolidation of a political interpretation | A single contested political interpretation of 2014 is presented in the summary as established fact. | The summary neither attributes this assessment nor offers alternative positions; it becomes the correct answer for pupils. |
| 251 | § 13 «БОРЬБА ЗА НЕЗАВИСИМОСТЬ». “§ 13 ‘The struggle for independence’.” | Redefinition of separatism as a liberation movement | The events of 2014 in Donetsk and Luhansk are given the language of a national liberation struggle. | The same textbook denies Ukrainian agency yet grants separatist structures the full language of “independence” and “popular uprising”. |
| 261 | § 14 «ВОЗВРАЩЕНИЕ В РОССИЮ». “§ 14 ‘Return to Russia’.” | Teleological finale | The end of the course is called a “return” rather than a change of borders or a Russian annexation. | The title of the final section turns the entire preceding course into the prehistory of a single predetermined conclusion. |
| 265 | «…президент Владимир Путин объявил о проведении специальной военной операции (СВО) на Украине. Главной целью СВО он назвал “защиту людей…”» “…President Vladimir Putin announced the start of a special military operation (SMO) in Ukraine. He named ‘the protection of people…’ as the main aim of the SMO.” | One-sided attribution of war aims | The Kremlin's official justification becomes the main explanatory frame, without any alternative assessment. | Even where this is formally presented as Putin's words, the surrounding text reinforces them as the factual explanation of the war's causes and aims. |
| 266 | «Докажите, что подвиги бойцов специальной военной операции достойны героев Великой Отечественной войны.» “Prove that the feats of the fighters of the special military operation are worthy of the heroes of the Great Patriotic War.” | Didactic glorification and historical analogy | Pupils must “prove” that participants in the SMO are equal to the heroes of the Second World War. | This is the most direct example of an indoctrinating exercise: the conclusion is given, and pupils are required only to argue in its favour. |
| 269 | «ДОНБАСС И НОВОРОССИЯ — ЭТО РОССИЯ!» “DONBAS AND NOVOROSSIYA ARE RUSSIA!” | Political slogan in a teaching text | Territorial belonging is formulated as a slogan rather than as a subject of historical or legal analysis. | The use of slogan form erases the boundary between teaching and state political agitation. |
| 269 | «Возвращение на Родину поддержал народ на всех освобождённых территориях.» “The return to the Motherland was supported by the people in all the liberated territories.” | Legitimisation through consensus | Territories under occupation are called “liberated”, and the outcome a “return to the Motherland”. | The sentence embeds three judgements at once: liberation, Russia as the Motherland, and popular support. |
| 270 | «Исторические земли России, Донбасс и Новороссия навсегда вернулись в её состав…» “The historical lands of Russia, Donbas and Novorossiya, have returned to it forever…” | Closing off historical alternatives | Donbas and “Novorossiya” are defined as “historical lands of Russia”, and the change of status as final. | The word “forever” moves the textbook from describing events to making a political declaration about the future. |
Overall conclusions from the evidence
1. In the Year 5 textbook, the existence of Rus' and the central role of Kyiv are not themselves erased. Instead, the heritage of Rus' is consistently redirected towards Moscow, while the Ukrainian line of continuity (through the Galician-Volhynian state, the Lithuanian-Rus' period and Cossack state-building) is not given equivalent agency.
2. The Zaporozhian Sich is acknowledged as a “Cossack republic”, but this agency is gradually reduced to the role of a military community within a “Russian” space. In the Years 6–7 textbook the most telling gap is 1775: the existence of the New Sich simply ends with a date, after which its lands “were included” in the Novorossiya Governorate.
3. In the Year 5 textbook the name “Ukraine” is introduced as a supposedly contemptuous Polish term for “the outskirts”, while the Khmelnytsky Uprising and Pereiaslav are described in the language of the “reunification of the Russian lands”. In this way Ukrainian political agency in the seventeenth century is replaced by the scheme “Little Rus' returns to Great Rus'”.
4. In the Years 6–7 textbook the imperial period is framed through the model “empty steppes → Russian development → prosperity”. Russian expansion is explicitly placed outside colonial violence by the claim that “only Russia” came “to support and enlighten”.
5. The Soviet Ukrainian and independent Ukrainian periods are constructed as a series of deviations from a “normal” Russian trajectory: inclusion in the Ukrainian SSR “against the will of the inhabitants”, Ukrainisation as “forcible imposition”, independence as “self-styled” (samostiinaya) statehood, 2014 as a “coup d'état” and 2022 as a “return to Russia”.
6. The strongest indoctrinating element is not any single quotation but the system of exercises. Pupils are regularly asked not to identify or compare interpretations, but to “explain” or “prove” a political thesis already formulated by the authors. This turns the textbook from an explanation of history into a mechanism for reproducing conclusions set by the state.