Original Russian-language document. Presidential Decree (Ukaz) No. 858 of the President of the Russian Federation, signed 25 November 2025, approving the annexed State National Policy Strategy of the Russian Federation to 2036. It enters into force on 1 January 2026 and replaces the 2012 Strategy to 2025 (Decree No. 1666, as amended in 2018 and 2024). The instrument comprises a four-point decree plus a Strategy in six sections and 61 numbered paragraphs. The embedded file also carries a finding aid highlighting the provisions that bear on coercion, counter-extremism and the occupied territories.
Presidential Decree No. 858 (25 November 2025) approves Russia's State National Policy Strategy to 2036, the master doctrine governing ethnic, linguistic and religious policy across the Russian Federation. The Strategy defines Russia as a "state-civilisation" united around the "state-forming Russian people" and makes counter-extremism (противодействие экстремизму) one of three headline priorities. It repeatedly and explicitly extends that framework to the four occupied Ukrainian regions — the Donetsk and Luhansk "People's Republics," Zaporizhzhia and Kherson Oblasts — describing their annexation as the "reunification" of "historical territories" (¶26), the "protection of the Russian-speaking population" from "the neo-Nazi leadership of Ukraine" (¶27), and a programme of integration measures running since 2023, coordinated by a dedicated territorial administration of the Federal Agency for Nationalities Affairs (FADN) (¶28–29). Paragraph 46 sets out "additional measures" specific to the occupied regions: imposition of Russian as the state language, "countering falsification of history," and "eliminating the consequences of the spread of anti-Russian propaganda, nationalism and religious discord." The Strategy directs the drawing of children and youth from the occupied regions into all-Russian campaigns and competitions, and the "re-qualification" of their teachers, culture-workers and archivists (¶38) — mechanisms of identity replacement. It mandates monitoring of ethnic and religious composition within the armed forces and in areas where military units are stationed (¶42z). Among its 2036 target metrics is a quantified assimilation objective: no fewer than 2,560,000 residents of the four occupied regions taking part in all-Russian events (¶59v). The Strategy is a whole-of-government instrument, implemented through the federal state programme "Realisation of State National Policy" and three-year action plans, with an annual state report to the President and Federal Assembly.
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Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 858
On the Strategy of State National Policy of the Russian Federation for the period to 2036. Moscow, Kremlin, 25 November 2025.
The operative decree runs to four points: (1) approval of the annexed Strategy to 2036; (2) instructions to the Government to draw up and approve action plans, ensure that federal executive bodies carry out the Strategy's tasks, monitor implementation and submit an annual state report to the President and to the chambers of the Federal Assembly, and bring presidential and governmental acts into conformity; (3) a recommendation that regional and local authorities be guided by the Strategy and prepare their own implementation plans; (4) entry into force from 1 January 2026.
Structure of the Strategy
Six sections, 61 paragraphs: (I) General provisions and definitions; (II) Current state of inter-ethnic relations; (III) Aim, principles, priority directions and tasks; (IV) Implementation in the regions of the Russian Federation; (V) Stages, instruments and mechanisms; (VI) Target indicators and expected results to 2036. The three headline priority directions (¶37) are: strengthening "all-Russian civic identity"; preserving ethnocultural and linguistic diversity; and securing inter-ethnic and inter-religious accord, "countering extremism" and the emergence of conflict.
Provisions bearing on the occupied territories and coercion
¶26–29 — The "new subjects." The Strategy lists the "reunification" of Crimea and Sevastopol (2014) and of the DPR, LPR, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson (2022) as a landmark for "all-Russian civic identity." It records that executive bodies for nationalities policy, socio-economic development programmes and inter-ethnic/inter-religious councils have been formed in the four regions, that a territorial administration of the Federal Agency for Nationalities Affairs (FADN) has been created, and that a complex of nationalities-policy measures has been carried out there since 2023 as a component of their integration into Russia's "legal, social, economic, educational, cultural and information space."
¶27 — "De-nazification" framing. The document asserts that "protection of the Russian-speaking population of the territories reunified with Russia, its liberation from many years of discrimination and violence on ethnic and religious grounds by the neo-Nazi leadership of Ukraine, created the conditions for restoring the unity of the historical territories of the Russian state."
¶31 — Threat catalogue. Lists as threats to national security the alleged spread of "ideologies of terrorism, extremism and neo-Nazism" and "Russophobic views" (31v); rising international "Russophobia" and "falsification of historical truth" (31g); and "the consequences of the spread of anti-Russian propaganda and the provocation of religious discord" in the DPR, LPR, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson (31d).
¶38 — Children, youth and education. Among the tasks: "involving children and youth from the DPR, LPR, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson in the delivery of projects and participation in all-Russian competitions and campaigns"; and "assisting the professional development (re-qualification) of teaching staff, culture workers and archivists from the DPR, LPR, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson." These sit alongside the state's promotion of Russian as the language of "the state-forming people" and mandatory presence of Russian state symbols throughout children's and young people's public life.
¶42(z) — Monitoring of the armed forces. Requires "consideration of ethnic and religious aspects when working with personnel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations and law-enforcement officers, and monitoring of the state of inter-ethnic relations in military collectives and in the areas where military units are stationed."
¶46 — Additional measures for the occupied regions. States that the specifics of implementation in the DPR, LPR, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson require "additional measures" to strengthen all-Russian civic identity, embed Russian as the state language, "counter manifestations of neo-Nazism and attempts to falsify history," and "eliminate the consequences of the spread of anti-Russian propaganda, nationalism and religious discord."
¶59 — 2036 target metrics. Quantified goals to be reached by 2036 include: all-Russian civic identity at no less than 95 per cent (59a); and — specific to the occupied territories — "no fewer than 2,560,000 citizens of the Russian Federation residing in the DPR, LPR, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson taking part in all-Russian events" (59v), a quantified assimilation objective.
Legal lineage and mechanism
The Strategy is grounded in the 2020 constitutional amendments (the "state-forming people," protection of "historical truth," Russian as state language), the 2021 National Security Strategy, the 2022 Decree on "traditional spiritual-moral values" (No. 809), the 2024 Decree on "historical enlightenment" (No. 314) and the 2025 Fundamentals of State Language Policy (No. 474). It is implemented chiefly through the federal state programme "Realisation of State National Policy," with three-year action plans, an annual state report due by 1 May, and review of the Strategy every six years. Ukraine, the EU, the US and the UN General Assembly regard Russia's annexation of these territories, and measures imposed on their residents, as unlawful.