- Russia has licensed ZNPP Units 1 and 2 under Russian nuclear law while simultaneously excluding the plant from its own 25-year national energy plan (RF Government Order No. 4153-r1). This deliberate paradox confirms tactical exploitation, with electricity extraction for Mariupol, cryptocurrency mining under Kiriyenko's personal supervision, and diplomatic leverage over US-fuel reactor negotiations, rather than strategic integration.
- All six reactors remain in cold shutdown. The primary safety risk is power supply to cooling systems: the main 750kV Dniprovska line has been disconnected twice in six months, with the September 2025 disconnection is assessed as a deliberate political provocation rather than an operational accident (TOT Insights assessment).
- TOT Insights assessment: Kiriyenko’s satisfaction with integration progress directly enabled Balitsky to secure a meeting with Putin, making ZNPP the clearest documented example of occupation infrastructure being leveraged for Kremlin political currency.6
ZNPP: Tactical Exploitation Under Occupation
6 Reactors total All cold shutdown | 2 Units licensed Units 1 & 2 | 0 In RF 2042 plan Absent from national scheme | 2× Mariupol electricity Via ZNPP integration | 4 US-fuel reactors Under US-Russia negotiation | 2026 Crypto launch Kiriyenko personal project |
Purpose. This note analyses Russia's approach to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant from its occupation in 2022 through March 2026, drawing on TOT Insights Hub entries. The central finding is a deliberate paradox: Russia is systematically licensing ZNPP reactors under Russian nuclear law while simultaneously excluding the plant from its own 25-year national energy plan. This signals tactical exploitation - electricity extraction, cryptocurrency mining, and diplomatic leverage - rather than strategic integration. All six reactors remain in cold shutdown. Power supply incidents constitute the primary ongoing safety risk.
1. Licensing Trajectory
Russia is pursuing a stepwise legal annexation of ZNPP through Rostekhnadzor licensing - formalising operational control that has existed since the first days of occupation:
Item licensed | Date | Issuing body | Significance |
Radiation sources | Pre-Nov 2025 | Rostekhnadzor | Initial legal foothold for Russian regulatory authority over plant |
Spent fuel storage (SNFSF) | Pre-Nov 2025 | Rostekhnadzor | Control over the most long-term sensitive component - spent nuclear fuel |
Unit 1 - 10-year operating licence | December 20252 | Rostekhnadzor | First reactor unit brought under Russian nuclear law. De facto legal annexation begins. |
Unit 2 - 10-year operating licence | February 18, 20262 | Rostekhnadzor | Second reactor unit licensed. Chernichuk interview confirms Rostekhnadzor's direct operational interference since day one. |
Units 3–6 | Not yet licensed | Pending | Restart procurement underway (pumping equipment confirmed). Personnel certification complete. Licensing expected to follow. |
Cryptocurrency mining farm | Planned 2026 | Kiriyenko / Presidential Admin | Project developed 2022–2025 under Kiriyenko's personal supervision. Publicly confirmed by Chernichuk to TASS. Opportunistic exploitation of plant's power output. |
Key admission. ZNPP head Chernichuk confirmed to TASS3 that Rostekhnadzor 'directly interferes in plant operation.' Rosatom-appointed operating organisation head Galeev confirmed Russian specialists have been present since the first days of occupation. The licensing trajectory formalises this pre-existing operational reality.
2. The Core Paradox: Tactical Not Strategic
The analytically decisive finding: ZNPP Unit 2 was issued a 10-year operating licence on February 18, 2026. Yet ZNPP is entirely absent from Russia's General Energy Development Scheme through 2042 (RF Government Order No. 4153-r, 30.12.20241) - neither among operating sites nor planned sites. Russia is licensing reactors it has not included in its own national energy plan.
TOT Insights assessment: this is not an oversight. It indicates deliberate tactical rather than strategic use, across three tracks:
- Track 1 - Grid extraction. Near-doubling of Mariupol electricity capacity through ZNPP integration; new 150kV and 330kV lines creating an RF-independent power contour. Immediate operational utility for Mariupol's planned industrial and manufacturing base.
- Track 2 - Cryptocurrency mining. Project developed 2022–2025 under Kiriyenko's personal supervision; launch planned 2026 once licences obtained; confirmed publicly by Chernichuk to TASS.3 Opportunistic financial extraction from a plant operating at zero output cost to Russia.
- Track 3 - US fuel reactor diplomacy. Four of the six reactors use American fuel. Russia is negotiating with the United States over control of these four reactors - seeking tacit US consent for the annexation of ZNPP's power generation as part of broader peace discussions.
Political dimension. ZNPP integration was one of the key projects inspected by Presidential Administration first deputy head Sergey Kiriyenko during his September 2025 visit to occupied Zaporizhzhia.6 TOT Insights assessment: Kiriyenko's satisfaction with the project's progress contributed directly to Balitsky securing a meeting with Putin - the only occupied-territory head to do so. ZNPP functions as a political asset as much as an energy one.
3. Safety Incidents
All six reactors remain in cold shutdown. The primary safety risk is power supply to the plant's own cooling and safety systems - not reactor operation. Russian forces are firing from positions in the plant's vicinity toward Ukrainian-controlled territory, placing the plant in direct proximity to active hostilities originating on the Russian-controlled side.
Date | Incident | Severity | Detail |
Sep 23, 2025 | Dniprovska line disconnected — provocation assessed | High | IAEA reported ZNPP was operating on a single external power source following the September 23 disconnection.5 TOT Insights assessment: the timing and pattern of the disconnection indicate deliberate use as a political provocation rather than an operational accident. |
Nov 8–9, 2025 | Ferrosplavna-1 backup line restored | Medium | Via IAEA-brokered ceasefire pause.4 First minimal power supply redundancy since May 2025. Restoration required active IAEA intervention. |
Nov 14, 2025 | 750kV Dniprovska disconnected - single power source | Critical | Protective automation disconnected the main 750kV 'Dniprovska' line. ZNPP again depended on a single power source. IAEA4: situation 'critically fragile.' Rolling blackouts began Nov 19, intensified Nov 25. |
Mar 24, 2026 | Dniprovska disconnected - artillery damage on Russian side | Critical | IAEA4 reported ZNPP disconnected from 'Dniprovska' power line after damage on Russian-controlled side during artillery activity from positions near the plant toward Ukrainian-controlled territory. Plant supplied via backup 'Ferrosplavna-1'. No radiation change. IAEA called for ceasefire and urgent repairs. |
4. Grid Integration Infrastructure
Period | Infrastructure development |
Q1 2025 | New high-voltage branch (ZNPP → Russian grid) under construction. Expected completion summer 2025. Once operational: industrial-level electricity for Mariupol manufacturing. |
Feb–May 2025 | Distribution node and compressor station constructed at 47°08'55.7"N 37°18'40.0"E - physical infrastructure connecting ZNPP output to Mariupol supply chain. (Centre for the Study of Occupation monitoring.6) |
Jun 2025 | Near-doubling of Mariupol electricity capacity confirmed. New substation 'Horod-12' (2×40 MVA transformers); reconstruction of 'Horod-6' (16→25 MVA); renewal of 'Azovska–Horod-2' line (6km). All enabled by ZNPP integration. (Centre for the Study of Occupation monitoring.6) |
Nov 2025 | New 150kV and 330kV lines included in occupied territory planning documents - creating an alternative RF power contour for ZNPP, independent of the Ukrainian grid. |
Mar 2026 | New power transmission lines under construction: Melitopol → Kamianka-Dniprovska and Yakymivka. ZNPP lies within 120km of proposed manganese extraction zone and within existing 110kV/330kV network serving Berdiansk and Melitopol. |
5. Watch Indicators
- Units 3–6 licensing: restart procurement (pumping equipment) is confirmed underway; personnel certification complete - watch for Rostekhnadzor licences for remaining units, likely in sequence following Units 1 and 2
- Cryptocurrency mining farm launch: planned for 2026 - confirmation of launch would be the clearest public signal of ZNPP's exploitation function
- US-Russia fuel reactor negotiations: outcome will determine whether 4 of 6 reactors can be restarted at all under current supply arrangements
- Dniprovska line status: the primary 750kV line has been disconnected twice in six months; restoration status and Russian infrastructure investments in the backup contour
- 2042 energy scheme update: any inclusion of ZNPP in a revised national energy plan would signal a shift from tactical to strategic integration
- RF Government Order No. 4153-r, 30.12.2024 (General Energy Development Scheme of the Russian Federation through 2042). government.ru (PDF) (opens via VPN only).
- Rostekhnadzor issued a 10-year operating licence for Unit 1 in December 2025 and for Unit 2 on 18 February 2026; an application has been submitted for Unit 6 and Rosatom aims to apply for Units 3–5 by end of 2026/2027. World Nuclear News, world-nuclear-news.org; NucNet, nucnet.org.
- Chernichuk, A. Interview with TASS confirming Rostekhnadzor operational interference and the cryptocurrency mining project under Kiriyenko's supervision. TASS, 3 January 2025, tass.ru.
- IAEA Director General Updates on the Situation in Ukraine (November 2025 and March 2026 updates). Available at iaea.org.
- The 750 kV Dniprovska line was disconnected on 23 September 2025, causing ZNPP's complete loss of off-site power. IAEA, Update 322, iaea.org.
- Centre for the Study of Occupation monitoring: Kiriyenko's September 2025 inspection visit to Zaporizhzhia; grid integration infrastructure data (substation names, coordinates, capacity figures); Balitsky's meeting with Putin. No public link.
Corrections are reviewed by the research team and incorporated into the next update.