Fieldwork: September 2026 · Operativna Sotsiolohiya · Second wave
Cite this output
TOT Insights and Operativna Sotsiolohiya. IDP Attitudes Survey 2026. October 2026. https://totinsights.org/idp-survey-2026.html
Full results of the second wave of the TOT Insights survey of internally displaced persons, fielded in September 2026 by the Ukrainian polling company Operativna Sotsiolohiya (Оперативна соціологія). Every question is published below as a table, with the September 2025 wave alongside wherever the same question was asked. Compiled by TOT Insights at the Centre for Statecraft and National Security, King's College London.
1,007 respondents · all questions with 2025 comparison · open-ended answers · English
Correction to the 2025 results. The 2025 table for the statement that most people remaining in the occupied territories are satisfied with the Russian authorities repeated, in error, the figures for the hidden-resistance question. The correct 2025 distribution is 26.2% definitely no, 32.4% rather no, 19.8% rather yes and 7.6% definitely yes (58.5% disagree, 27.4% agree). Two smaller transpositions and rounding slips were also fixed. The 2025 workbook has been reissued, and the corrected figures are used throughout this page.
Key findings
Fewer think the remaining population is content with Russian rule. 15.6% agree that most people who stayed are satisfied with the Russian authorities, down from 27.4% in 2025 (19.0% among respondents from occupied settlements). 63.5% disagree.
Belief in hidden resistance has softened, and uncertainty has grown. 51.8% say there is hidden resistance to the occupiers (55.2% in the comparable subsample), against 61.6% in 2025. "Hard to say" rose from 20.4% to 28.2%.
Displaying Ukrainian identity is seen as the greatest risk. Asked for the first time, 54.9% name using Ukrainian symbols and 50.3% name refusing a Russian passport as behaviour that can provoke violence from the Russian authorities.
Property loss is widespread. Among respondents in contact with the occupied territories whose family had property there, 45.0% report it destroyed or damaged and 10.3% report it declared "ownerless" and transferred to the occupation authorities; 28.3% know of "ownerless" seizures among relatives or acquaintances.
Strong support for strikes on military targets. 75.0% consider Ukrainian strikes on targets in the occupied territories justified, with military bases and ammunition depots the top priorities and facilities in residential areas chosen by 1.5%.
Return and prejudice. 55.7% of those from still-occupied settlements plan to return after de-occupation. 45.0% have faced prejudice as displaced people, most often in everyday communication and when renting housing.
Assessments of the Ukrainian government are little changed. 72.5% rate its support for IDPs ineffective (76.6% comparable), against 76.4% in 2025.
Reading the comparison with 2025
Both waves were fielded by telephone by the same company with around 1,000 respondents, but the samples differ. In 2025 every respondent came from a settlement that had been occupied. The 2026 sample is broader: 24.4% come from settlements that have never been occupied, and all respondents consider themselves displaced. Comparisons can therefore reflect who was asked as well as changes in opinion. Tables with a 2025 figure also show a 2026 comparable column restricted to the 725 respondents whose pre-invasion settlement was occupied at some point, and the change column compares that subsample with 2025. Contact with the occupied territories illustrates the difference: 37.6% of the full 2026 sample keep in touch, against 47.8% of the comparable subsample and 48.6% in 2025.
The comparable subsample is a TOT Insights calculation from the respondent-level file; all other figures are as supplied by the pollster and were checked against that file. Question numbers differ between waves; each table lists its 2025 equivalent.
Method
Computer-assisted telephone interviews (CATI) with 1,007 internally displaced persons, September 2026, by Operativna Sotsiolohiya.
Respondents originate mainly from Donetsk (56.7%), Kharkiv (14.6%), Kherson (11.0%), Zaporizhzhia and Luhansk oblasts (6.9% each); 2.6% now live abroad.
Margin of error at 95% confidence: 3.1% for values near 50%, 2.7% near 25% or 75%, 1.4% near 5% or 95%. Margins are wider for questions asked of a subset; each table shows its base.
As fielded, questions 19 to 25 (media trust, living standards, property, shortages, information sources) were asked only of the 371 respondents in regular contact with acquaintances in the occupied territories.
Open-ended "other" answers were translated into English by the pollster and are listed under the relevant tables. Individual respondent records are not published.
The 2025 wave (n=1,001) remains available on its own page with a permanent DOI.
2026, all respondents2025Hover a row for exact values
The 2025 figures shown here are corrected. The table originally published in 2025 repeated the distribution for the hidden-resistance question by mistake.
Q12
Do you agree with the statement that "there is hidden resistance to the occupiers in the occupied territories"?
Publishing or distributing public lists of collaborators
195
19.4
21.1
29.2
-8.1
Spreading pro-Ukrainian or anti-occupation content on Telegram, TikTok or other platforms
191
19.0
20.4
29.5
-9.1
Supporting local cyber awareness (e.g. running basic offline digital security trainings)
184
18.3
20.0
23.1
-3.1
Taking photos with Ukrainian symbols (ribbons, posters) and publishing them online
164
16.3
17.7
25.5
-7.8
None of the above
120
11.9
11.9
not asked
Other
62
6.2
6.1
8.8
-2.7
Hard to say
221
21.9
21.2
24.6
-3.4
Prefer not to answer
19
1.9
2.1
1.8
+0.3
Options marked with no 2025 figure were added in 2026.
Other: what respondents named (62 answers, translated by the pollster)
don't know (5)
dont know (5)
doesn't know (4)
food (3)
all (2)
everything listed (2)
access to social media is limited there, there is nothing
against Russia, against everything
all actions on the list
all are risky and everything listed
all are worth the risk
all of the above
all people must be evacuated at once
anything related to Ukraine irritates them
Armed resistance
assisting the resistance
contact with parents and relatives
cutting off the occupiers' communications
delivery of humanitarian aid
evacuation and information
Everything applies
everything is risky
hardly anything will help
have not been in the occupied territories
Helping elderly people
helping elderly people and people with disabilities
humanitarian aid
I can't say
I don't know what is happening there
I don't know what pro-Ukrainian things you can do without being condemned
I wouldn't do anything like that
It is worth risking for what helps our soldiers
it's very hard there, no healthcare, if you said something, they shoot you dead
Leaving for government-controlled territory of Ukraine
only if completely safe, can't answer
our government should have carried out the evacuation without asking them; the evacuation should have been done immediately, people would have been saved
people decide for themselves whether to take risks or not, at their own discretion
Photographing the occupiers' military equipment
refusing a Russian passport
running elective classes on in-depth Ukrainian history
Social media
Supporting people
the Russians will beat you up (derogatory)
they shoot without talking
those who wanted to leave have left
visiting prohibited places
you can end up in a basement
Contact with the occupied territories
Q16
Please tell us, do you keep in touch with acquaintances in the temporarily occupied territories?