- The deficit jumps about 74% and the real dependency runs far deeper. The official deficit rises from RUB 375.6 million to RUB 654.9 million, but own revenues cover only around 22.5% of spending, leaving an underlying gap of RUB 5.785 billion that is closed by drawing down reserves rather than by new income.
- Federal money is shrinking while the burden shifts onto residents. Transfers fall by RUB 1.535 billion even as planned personal income tax rises 55.9%, pointing to stronger fiscal extraction from the population, public-sector and utility workers, and re-registered businesses.
- Spending choices show control taking priority over reconstruction. Education climbs above half the budget (RUB 4.266 billion) as an instrument of control, culture, sport and youth policy stay protected to sustain an image of normal life, and housing and utilities are cut by nearly 43%.
This briefing analyses the amendment, dated 7 May 2026,1 to the budget of the Mariupol urban district for 2026 and the 2027-2028 planning period. It draws on the published budget document.
The amendment sharply increases the official budget deficit, from RUB 375.571 million to RUB 654.861 million, a rise of RUB 279.29 million, or roughly 74.4%. The scale of that change reflects a substantial deterioration in the fiscal balance, well beyond a routine technical adjustment.
Main parameters of the updated 2026 budget
| Indicator | Amount |
|---|---|
| Revenue | RUB 6.813 billion |
| Expenditures | RUB 7.468 billion |
| Official deficit | RUB 654.861 million |
| Own tax and non-tax revenues | RUB 1.683 billion |
| Gratuitous receipts / transfers | RUB 5.130 billion |
Revenues after the amendment are set at RUB 6.813 billion, of which RUB 1.683 billion are own tax and non-tax revenues and RUB 5.130 billion are gratuitous transfers. Expenditures are set at RUB 7.468 billion, meaning the budget is planned from the outset with a deficit of nearly RUB 655 million.
Comparison with 2025
| Indicator | 2025 (latest version) | 2026 (after amendment) | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | RUB 7.744 bn | RUB 6.813 bn | -RUB 930.5 m / -12.0% |
| Expenditures | RUB 8.541 bn | RUB 7.468 bn | -RUB 1.073 bn / -12.6% |
| Planned deficit | RUB 797.3 m | RUB 654.9 m | -RUB 142.4 m |
| Transfers | RUB 6.665 bn | RUB 5.130 bn | -RUB 1.535 bn |
| Own revenues | RUB 1.079 bn | RUB 1.683 bn | +RUB 604 m |
Formally, the 2026 deficit is smaller than the latest 2025 figure. Both revenues and expenditures have been cut, however, particularly the transfer component, so the smaller deficit reflects contraction rather than recovery. The core trend is that Russia is reducing direct budgetary injections while the local administration plans to extract more revenue directly from the occupied territory.
The real deficit: a deeper dependency
The official deficit is RUB 654.861 million, but the underlying fiscal dependency is far larger.
| Indicator | Amount |
|---|---|
| Total expenditures | RUB 7.468 bn |
| Own revenues | RUB 1.683 bn |
| Gap | RUB 5.785 bn |
Without transfers and existing cash balances, Mariupol can cover only about 22.5% of its expenditures from its own revenues. The deficit is closed not by new revenue but by drawing down account balances: the document explicitly identifies RUB 654.861 million from balance adjustments as the financing source. Rather than improving sustainability, the budget plugs the gap with reserves.
A shift in the revenue model
In 2025, roughly 86% of revenues came from higher-level transfers. In the amended 2026 budget the transfer share falls to about 75.3%. On the surface this suggests greater fiscal independence, though the underlying drivers tell a different story. Own revenues rise mainly because of a sharp increase in planned personal income tax (PIT) collection.
| Source | 2025 plan | 2026 after amendment | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| PIT | RUB 958.7 m | RUB 1.495 bn | +RUB 536.2 m / +55.9% |
PIT becomes the primary internal revenue source. This reflects expectations of stronger fiscal extraction from the population, public-sector and utility workers, re-registered businesses, and administratively formalised employment, rather than economic recovery.
Expenditures: education expands, utilities are cut
| Sector | 2025 plan | 2026 after amendment | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Education | RUB 3.665 bn | RUB 4.266 bn | +RUB 600.5 m / +16.4% |
| Housing & utilities | RUB 2.502 bn | RUB 1.431 bn | -RUB 1.071 bn / -42.8% |
| National economy | RUB 942 m | RUB 454 m | -RUB 488 m / -51.8% |
| Administration | RUB 889 m | RUB 672 m | -RUB 217 m / -24.4% |
| Culture | RUB 257 m | RUB 293 m | +RUB 36.6 m / +14.3% |
| Sports | RUB 229 m | RUB 287 m | +RUB 57.4 m / +25.0% |
| Social policy | RUB 56 m | RUB 59.5 m | +RUB 3.4 m / +6.1% |
Education rises to RUB 4.266 billion, over 57% of total 2026 expenditure and higher than in 2025. The document separately funds preschool and general education, school meals, homeroom leadership, and "advisers to school principals for upbringing." Within the occupation budget, education serves as a key infrastructure of control alongside its ordinary role as a social sector.
Housing and utilities, by contrast, are cut by nearly 43%, from RUB 2.5 billion to RUB 1.43 billion, directly contradicting public narratives about "rebuilding Mariupol." A significant share of what remains goes not to systemic infrastructure but to beautification, street lighting, repair of residential premises, temporary housing stock, and a "comfortable urban environment."
The showcase gets more expensive
Culture rises to RUB 293.2 million and sports to RUB 286.8 million, nearly RUB 580 million combined, against just RUB 59.5 million for social policy. Culture and sports thus receive almost ten times the funding of social policy. Separate 2026 programme allocations include culture and arts (RUB 437.6 million), sports (RUB 284.2 million) and youth policy (RUB 73.8 million). The priority is controlled public activity, events and youth engagement, in what amounts to a "showcase normality" budget.
The administrative apparatus is preserved
"General government issues" fall to RUB 672.3 million but still account for nearly 9% of the budget, with funding retained for the administration, city council, finance department, territorial bodies, capital construction management, administrative support centres, information systems, and civil-servant training. Even under deficit conditions and utility cuts, the full administrative architecture is preserved.
2027-2028 outlook: sharp compression
| Year | Expenditures |
|---|---|
| 2026 | RUB 7.468 bn |
| 2027 | RUB 4.827 bn |
| 2028 | RUB 4.983 bn |
Planned 2027 expenditure is roughly 35% below 2026. The document also lists "conditionally approved expenditures" of RUB 140.5 million for 2027 and RUB 290.1 million for 2028. This treats 2026 as a transitional budget with one-off pressure partly covered by reserves, while 2027-2028 are planned on an austerity model.
Assessment
The amendment points to a harsher, more deficit-driven model of maintaining the occupied city:
- The official deficit rises sharply, from RUB 375.6 million to RUB 654.9 million, nearly 74%.
- Real dependency is far deeper, with own revenues covering only 22.5% of expenditures and an underlying gap of RUB 5.785 billion.
- Transfers shrink while planned own revenues, especially PIT, rise, indicating stronger fiscal pressure on residents.
- Education exceeds RUB 4.26 billion and more than half of all spending, budgetary evidence that control over children, schools and ideological upbringing remains a strategic priority.
- Housing and utilities are cut by nearly 43%, indicating that systemic reconstruction is not the priority.
- Culture, sports and youth policy remain protected, sustaining an image of normal life and shaping youth loyalty.
- The 2027-2028 plan already signals contraction of roughly one-third, indicating no large-scale sustainable reconstruction.
Overall, this functions as a budget of control, fiscal extraction, reserve depletion and reduced real reconstruction rather than one of development. Russia is optimising the cost of occupation rather than scaling the city's recovery.
Primary Sources
Decision of the Mariupol City Council [“Donetsk People’s Republic”] No. I/10-1, 7 May 2026, “On amendments to Decision No. I/19-5 of 24.12.2025 ‘On the budget of the municipal formation of the Mariupol urban okrug for 2026 and the planning period 2027–2028’.” Occupation administration source.
Decision of the Mariupol City Council [“Donetsk People’s Republic”] No. I/19-5, 24 December 2025, “On the budget of the municipal formation of the Mariupol urban okrug for 2026 and the planning period 2027–2028.” Occupation administration source.
Centre for the Study of Occupation, Analysis of amendments to the Mariupol budget for 2026, 7 May 2026.
Notes
- Decision of the Mariupol City Council [“Donetsk People’s Republic”] No. I/10-1, 7 May 2026. Occupation administration source. ↩
Corrections are reviewed by the research team and incorporated into the next update.